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Abstract 
Using the dietary supplement black cohosh to demonstrate our method, we employ data on a 
product characteristic unobservable to consumers to decompose the contribution to consumers’ 
valuations of observable characteristics into surrogate indicator and direct components.  Because 
consumers are not all “expert appraisers” of the unobservable characteristic, the measured 
relationship of indicators to the unobservable quality is generally not the one consumers 
perceive.  Consequently, biases that depend upon the nature of consumers’ ineptitude are 
introduced into the component estimation.  The researcher’s inference problem is solved by 
recognizing that consumers with greater appraisal expertise sort disproportionately to higher 
quality products.  This enables feasible measurement of inept consumers’ relative valuations and 
conjectures through separate hedonic estimation on high- and low-quality product subsamples.  
We find that, relative to experts, inept consumers likely underestimate the value of most 
observable characteristics in indicating black cohosh product authenticity; however they 
overweight online product ratings. 
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 Prices indicate the product characteristics that consumers value, but they do not tell us 
why consumers value them.  While in some cases consumers might value a characteristic 
intrinsically, in other cases characteristics are valued as a signal, or surrogate indicator, of the 
level of some quality that is not directly observable.  For example, a knowledgeable owner of a 
porcelain vase may find its shape and painted decoration aesthetically pleasing; meanwhile, she 
may value the vase’s thickness as an indicator of its authenticity as an artifact of the Ming 
Dynasty, rather than, say, because it makes the vase more durable or beautiful (see Brook 1998, 
pp. 225-6). 
Standard hedonic analysis, which deals in the valuation of observable qualities, would tell 
us only that consumers value thickness in a vase.  To know why, it is necessary to measure the 
unobservable characteristic (here, authenticity), which is not a common element of product 
valuation analyses. 
 This paper demonstrates a method of estimating, as two distinct valuation components, 
consumers’ intrinsic valuation of observable characteristics and their valuation of those 
characteristics as surrogate indicators.  It makes use of unique data measuring authenticity (i.e., 
whether the product contains the key ingredients claimed on the label) for a sample of brands of 
black cohosh, a medicinal herb believed to help with menopause symptoms.  As a medication, 
black cohosh is properly characterized as a credence good, or product for which key quality-
related characteristics, such as botanical authenticity, are not observable even after purchase and 
use (Darby and Karni 1973, Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). We obtain data on authenticity in 
the laboratory through a standard analytical method called high-performance liquid 
chromatography.  Thus we observe a critical quality-related product characteristic that 
consumers have not.  By incorporating instrumented (fitted) values for authenticity into our 
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hedonic regression equation, we are able to take our analysis beyond the standard hedonic 
valuation of observable product characteristics, to gain insight into the extent to which these 
characteristics are valued as indicators. 
An empirical conundrum is posed, however, by the fact that not all consumers are “expert 
appraisers” of key unobservable qualities.  Two possibilities exist.  First, consumers may suffer 
from various forms of unawareness.
1
  They may not be aware of the need to appraise a certain 
unobservable quality; or they may be aware of it, but unaware that information at their disposal 
from observable characteristics could provide insight into it.  Alternatively, consumers may be 
aware that an observable characteristic can help in appraisal of an unobservable quality, but they 
may not know in what way or to what extent.
 2
  This second possibility – that consumers are 
aware, but are inept at appraisal – is the one that poses the problem. 
Consider, again, the Ming Dynasty vase for which thickness is a surrogate indicator of 
authenticity.  If all consumers were expert appraisers, then assuming we could observe 
authenticity, it would be possible to use the empirical relationship between thickness and 
authenticity to decompose the contribution of thickness to the price of the vase into intrinsic 
(e.g., durability) and surrogate indicator components.  If, instead, all consumers were unaware 
that thickness could be used to diagnose the authenticity of a vase, or unaware that a vase’s 
possible authenticity as a Ming Dynasty artifact should be taken into consideration, then there 
would likewise be no empirical problem.  One would know for a fact that the contribution of 
thickness to the price of the vase was entirely based on the intrinsic value of thickness.  But now 
suppose that consumers are aware that a vase with Chinese motifs might be a valuable artifact, 
and also aware (if vaguely) that thickness might help one determine authenticity, but not 
knowledgeable enough to accurately increment their forecasts of the likelihood that the vase is 
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authentic per millimeter thickness of the item.  If so, then the empirical relationship of thickness 
to authenticity would be misleading to determining the basis for how thickness is being valued 
by the market.  This is because the relationship contains information not being used by the inept 
consumer.  Thus a decomposition of the consumer’s valuation of thickness based on this 
relationship leads to biased estimation of the components.  Further, in such a case, it becomes 
difficult to interpret the strength of the empirical relationship of authenticity to market prices, as 
the relationship conflates the measurement of consumers’ tastes for authenticity with their 
ineptitude at appraisal. 
We struggle to provide some clarity regarding consumers’ valuations and conjectures 
when quality is unobservable by classifying inept appraisal using surrogate indicators into three 
cases.  A consumer might overshoot, overestimating the power of the surrogate indicator to 
predict the unobservable characteristic.  Or she might undershoot, underestimating its power of 
prediction.  Or she might entertain a fallacy, reversing in her prediction the true sign of the 
relationship between surrogate indicator and unobservable characteristic.  Expert appraisal is 
nested in this structure as a boundary sub-case between “overshoot” and “undershoot,” while 
unawareness is a boundary sub-case between “undershoot” and “fallacy.” 
 The empirical problem of extracting information about surrogate indicator use is partially 
overcome by inferring consumers’ expertise levels from their choices.  Consumers with greater 
appraisal expertise are better at discerning quality, and so sort disproportionately to higher 
quality products. This enables the researcher to measure the surrogate indicator valuations and 
conjectures of inept consumers relative to experts by separately performing hedonic analysis on 
high- and low-quality product pools.  We demonstrate the method using separate estimation on 
authentic and non-authentic black cohosh subsamples. 
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 The idea that consumers sort across quality grades based on differences in ability is not 
new.  A number of theoretical analyses have considered market outcomes in situations in which 
some consumers are inattentive, unskilled, or otherwise experience higher costs to evaluating 
market information than others (Salop and Stiglitz 1977, Nagler 1993, Gabaix and Laibson 2006, 
Armstrong and Chen 2009).  One consistent finding across this literature is that people with 
different abilities select different products (or, more generally, product choice strategies), such 
that more skilled, less cost-encumbered individuals get better deals (e.g., lower price per unit 
quality) than those less skilled and more cost-encumbered.  The present paper’s innovation is an 
empirical methodology that uses sorting as a tool to extract information relevant to managerial 
decision-making.  One may apply the methods developed in this study to create targeted pricing, 
product and promotion strategies based on consumer expertise levels.  These methods may also 
be used in certain contexts to evaluate the effects of public policies (see concluding section). 
 The existing literature on indicators of product quality focuses largely on how different 
surrogate indicators, such as country-of-origin and perceived difficulty of manufacture, influence 
consumers’ perceptions of quality (e.g., Quester et al. 2000, West et al. 2002, Jo 2005, Johnson 
and Folkes 2007).  Much of the research emphasis has been on the role of price as an indicator of 
quality; analyses of this have included experimental studies (e.g., Brucks et al. 2000, West et al. 
2002) and some meta-analytic reviews (Rao and Monroe 1989, Völckner and Hofmann 2007).  
By and large, the studies are descriptive: none provides a methodology for using data on 
surrogate indicators and underlying qualities as a tool for making inferences about consumers’ 
valuations and quality judgments. 
 Another strand of work, related to the literature on the influence of indicators, looks at 
the accuracy of consumer perceptions.  In a set of analyses involving both durable and non-
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durable goods, Burton and Lichtenstein (1989, 1990) considered how consumers’ perceptions of 
the price-quality relationship contrast with actual price-quality.  Mason et al. (2001) examined 
the determinants of consumers’ accuracy at judging brand performance on various attributes.  
One thing these studies have in common is that they ascertain consumer accuracy using as 
benchmarks for “objective” quality measures that are publicly available to consumers – for 
example, ratings in Consumer Reports.  The present paper is unique in that its measure of 
objective quality is one that consumers could not possibly have observed themselves; thus we 
eliminate the possibility that consumers may have improved their accuracy by “peeking” at the 
objective measures.   
We proceed as follows.  We lay out a model of unobservable characteristics and 
surrogate indicators, examine the empirical problem posed by inept consumer appraisal, and 
consider how consumer sorting addresses this problem. Next, we present results from empirical 
analysis of the market for black cohosh.  Finally, we conclude. 
 
MODEL 
 
Unobservable Product Qualities 
 The standard hedonic approach posits a representative consumer who values a product as 
a bundle of characteristics.  For our purposes, let us consider a product consisting of K 
observable characteristics, 
 
X
k
, k=1,…,K, and one unobservable characteristic, z.  Thus the utility 
the consumer obtains from consuming the product is given by 
(1) 
 
U =U X
1
,..., X
K
, z( )  
The corresponding hedonic regression equation specifies, for brand i, 
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(2) 
 
log P
i
= ! + "
1
X
1i
+ ...+ "
K
X
Ki
+ #
i
 
 
where 
 
X
ki
 is the value of the kth characteristic for brand i, and !  is a stochastic disturbance 
term.  Note that z does not enter this regression because it is not observable.  Estimation of the 
equation in (2) allows measurement of the extent to which the consumer values increments in 
each of the observable variables, that is, 
 
!
k
" #P #X
k
.  But, as discussed in the introduction, it 
does not provide information on the extent to which observables are valued as indicators of z.  
Nor does one get any sense as to how much the consumer values increments in z. 
 In general, the value of each observable characteristic 
 
X
k
 provides information about the 
value of z, following from some functional relationship 
(3) 
 
z = z X
1
,..., X
K
( )  
Assuming 
 
!z !X
k
 is nonzero, 
 
X
k
 is said to be a surrogate indicator of z. If 
 
!z !X
k
> 0 , then we 
say that 
 
X
k
 is a positive indicator of z.  If 
 
!z !X
k
< 0 , then 
 
X
k
 is a negative indicator of z.  We 
may therefore decompose the slope coefficients 
 
!
k
 in (2) as: 
(4) 
 
!P !X
k
= !P !X
k D
+ !P !z " !z !X
k
 
 
That is, the effect of each observable characteristic on the price of the product is equal to the sum 
of its direct effect as a quality with intrinsic value to the consumer and its indirect effect as a 
surrogate indicator to the consumer of the valued unobservable characteristic.
3
 
 Now suppose we are able to privately observe z, so that z may be included along with the 
observable variables.  Then (2) becomes 
(5) 
 
log P
i
= !
D
+ "z
i
+ #
1D
X
1i
+ ...+ #
KD
X
Ki
+$
i
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where !  is the stochastic disturbance term for the augmented equation.  Also, we may write a 
regression equation that determines the value of z, corresponding to (3), 
(6) 
 
z
i
= a + b
1
X
1i
+ ...+ b
K
X
Ki
+ !
i
 
 
where !  is a stochastic disturbance.  The estimation of (5) poses problems: because z is not 
observed directly by consumers, it must be viewed as endogenously determined based on (6).  In 
general, characteristics that consumers use to infer the value of z but that are not observed by the 
researcher will be correlated with variables that consumers value intrinsically and that are not 
observed by the researcher; that is, !  is correlated with ! .  Thus the coefficients in (5) are 
estimated with bias.  To resolve this problem, it is necessary to instrument for z with a subset of 
the 
 
X
k
.  Importantly, this can only be accomplished if one can identify ex ante at least one 
observable characteristic, 
 
X
k*
, that the consumer does not intrinsically value at all, hence 
!
k*
= 0 .  This is needed to ensure that the exclusion criteria are met for identification of z in the 
instrumented version of (5). 
 Properly instrumenting for z with  zˆ  yields 
(7) 
 
log P
i
= !!
D
+ !" zˆ
i
+ !#
1D
X
1i
+ ...+ !#
KD
X
Ki
+ !$
i
 
which may be efficiently estimated.  In (7), the effect of the 
 
X
k
 on price through z is controlled 
for, so a decomposition has been effected.  The coefficients on the 
 
X
k
 represent the direct effect 
of the 
 
X
k
 on price, 
 
!P !X
k D
, purged of the effect that the 
 
X
k  
have as indicators of the value of 
z.  Since the coefficient on z is 
 
!P !z , it appears that by estimating (2) and (7), we may obtain 
each component in (4). 
 
Inept Appraisal 
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 The above estimation procedure makes a critical assumption that all consumers 
incorporate the full 
 
!z !X
k
 in their valuation of the 
 
X
k
.  This is because including  zˆ  in (7) 
controls for the 
 
!z !X
k
 based on the actual empirical relationship of z to the 
 
X
k
.  Thus it 
assumes that consumers are aware of all the information each observable characteristic provides 
about the value of z.  This is true if consumers are expert appraisers of z, but it is not true if they 
are not. 
 Let us continue to maintain the assumption of a single representative consumer, but allow 
that the consumer might not be an expert appraiser of z.  In light of this, it is necessary to be 
more precise about what we mean by 
 
!z !X
k
.  Let us define 
 
!z !X
k T
 as the total information 
content that 
 
X
k
 provides on z, which in turn may be thought of as the sum of two components: 
 
!z !X
k A
, the component the consumer is aware of or presumes in her appraisal of z; and 
 
!z !X
k U
, the component the consumer is unaware of (i.e., the gap between the actual 
 
!z !X
k T
 
and what the consumer presumes).  With this newly defined structure, the decomposition in (4) is 
re-written as 
(8) 
 
!P !X
k
= !P !X
k D
+ !P !z " !z !X
k A
 
 
reflecting that the surrogate indicator influence of the 
 
X
k
 on prices occurs only through that 
portion of the 
 
X
k
’s explaining power that the consumer presumes. 
 Now it may be seen that estimation of (7) actually yields 
 
!P !X
k D
" !P !z # !z !X
k U
 as 
the coefficients on the 
 
X
k
, not the 
 
!P !X
k D
; the latter are unrecoverable without knowing the 
extent and nature of the consumer’s inept use of each surrogate indicator 
 
X
k
.  Put another way, 
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estimation of (7) provides biased estimates of the 
 
!P !X
k D
, where the bias is given by 
 
!"P "z # "z "X
k U
.  The sign of the bias for each 
 
X
k
 depends on three things: whether the 
unobservable characteristic z is valued positively or negatively by the market (i.e., the sign of 
 
!P !z ), whether 
 
X
k
 is a positive or negative surrogate indicator of z (i.e., the sign of 
 
!z !X
k T
), 
and the nature of consumers’ ineptitude in using 
 
X
k
  to appraise z (i.e., the relationship of 
 
!z !X
k A
 to 
 
!z !X
k T
). 
 Delving into this last item in greater detail, let us assume that consumers exhibit a 
consistent form of ineptitude for each 
 
X
k
, that is, the relationship of 
 
!z !X
k A
 to 
 
!z !X
k T
 does 
not vary for a given k.  We classify this relationship into three mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive cases based on the value of 
 
µ
k
!
"z
"X
k A
( ) "z"X
k T
( ) .  First, suppose  µk > 1.  
This implies consumers sign the relationship between 
 
X
k
 and z correctly but perceive that 
 
X
k
 
moves z more than it actually does.  In this case, consumers overshoot.  Second, suppose 
 
µ
k
! 0,1( ) .  This implies consumers sign the relationship between 
 
X
k
 and z correctly but 
perceive that 
 
X
k
 moves z less than it actually does.  In this case, consumers undershoot.  Third, 
suppose 
 
µ
k
< 0 .  This implies consumers sign the relationship between 
 
X
k
 and z incorrectly – 
that is, they perceive z rises with 
 
X
k
 when it actually falls, or falls with 
 
X
k
 when it actually 
rises.  In this case, consumers are said to entertain a fallacy about the 
 
X
k
. Complete unawareness 
of a surrogate indicator would be represented by the borderline value 
 
µ
k
= 0 , while for expert 
appraisers
 
µ
k
= 1 . 
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 Table 1 summarizes the researcher’s potential bias outcomes based on this classification.  
For example, for a positively valued unobservable characteristic and positive surrogate indicator, 
the estimate of 
 
!P !X
k D
 is positively biased when consumers overshoot.  Intuitively, this is 
because consumers assign more surrogate indicator value to the variable then merited by its 
actual empirical relationship to the unobservable characteristic; so their intrinsic valuation of the 
variable, as a component of overall valuation, is overestimated when the estimation considers the 
actual empirical relationship instead of the perceived one.  Note that while we may speak of the 
biases in estimation conditional on each consumer conjecture, we normally are able to measure 
neither the estimation bias nor the conjecture. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 The empirical conundrum created by consumers’ ineptitude at appraisal may be viewed 
through another lens by estimating (6), which shows the actual empirical relationship between 
the 
 
X
k
 and z.  This relationship, as we have discussed, is generally not known to the non-expert 
consumer.  Thus the coefficients on the 
 
X
k
 are the 
 
!z !X
k T
 rather than the 
 
!z !X
k A
.  In 
practical terms, though estimation of (6) may indicate a good fit of z with the 
 
X
k
, it is not 
necessarily the case that consumers have in actuality obtained a good fix on z. 
The measure of 
 
!P !z  obtained from estimating (7) also reflects the conundrum.  The 
coefficient varies with two effects that are not separately identified: the consumer’s valuation of 
z, and the consumer’s composite competence at using the surrogate indicators of z.  Thus a small 
 
!P !z  conflates consumer unawareness with respect to z with consumer apathy. It is possible, 
moreover, that 
 
!P !z  takes the “wrong” sign, that is, negative for a characteristic that consumers 
value positively.  This occurs when appraisal using available indicators is sufficiently inept and 
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fallacious that consumers perceive an unobservable characteristic to be more present when it is in 
fact less present.   Thus an unobservable characteristic desired by consumers could actually be 
valued negatively by the market. 
 
Differences in Appraisal Expertise 
 Let us now consider the possibility that not all consumers are equally inept: some may be 
expert appraisers while others are less skilled. Generally, not all people will have the same 
exposures or experiences that enable them to learn.  Even if they did, differences across 
individuals would lead to different learning with respect to the same exposure.  The consequence 
is differences in knowledge and appraisal expertise across individuals. 
 To model this, let us begin by assuming that consumers differ only with respect to their 
appraisal expertise, and that they are identical with respect to their tastes for product attributes.  
That is, different consumers j will be characterized by different levels of 
 
!z !X
k A( j )
 for each k.  
This will tend to result in different levels 
 
!P !X
k ( j )
 for each consumer; however, the direct 
valuation components, 
 
!P !X
k D
, will be the same for all.  Appraisal expertise may be defined 
in an overall sense based on the relative ability of different consumers in essence to fit (6) from 
the 
 
X
k
 using their conjectures about the 
 
!z !X
k
.  Specifically, consumer j’ is “more expert at 
appraisal” than j” if !z !X
k U ( j ')( )
2
" X
k
#
$%
&
'(
k
) < !z !Xk U ( j ")( )
2
" X
k
#
$%
&
'(
k
) , where 
 
X
k
= X
ki
i
! ; that is, 
if her weighted sum of squared conjectural error is lower.
4
  Thus less-expert individuals, so 
defined, are more prone to errors in distinguishing high-z brands from low-z brands. 
 The assumption of differences in expertise across consumers has implications for the 
distribution of consumers across products.  This may be seen by considering a simple example in 
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which there are two brands, H and L, and two consumers, j’ and j”.  Assume H exhibits higher 
quality with respect to the unobserved characteristic, i.e., z
H
> z
L
.  Suppose the two consumers 
have identical conjectures with respect to all the 
 
!z !X
k
 except for one, and for that k’ let 
!z !Xk ' U ( j ') < !z !Xk ' U ( j ") .  Thus consumer j” is less expert than j’.  It follows that j” is more 
likely than j’ to conclude erroneously that H is the low-quality product and L the high-quality 
product.  Thus, given any price pair for the two products, j” is more likely to choose L, all else 
being equal; that is, for a given price, j” is more likely to conclude (erroneously) that L is the 
better buy based on her erroneous appraisal of z
H
 and z
L
. We can see that consumers who are 
more expert at appraisal will tend to sort to the high-quality product, while inept consumers sort 
to the low-quality product.  Sorting of consumers will not necessarily be perfect; however, there 
will generally be differences in the average expertise of consumers across product pools 
correlated with the level of unobservable characteristic. 
 Consumer sorting based on expertise levels has important empirical measurement 
implications, observable in our simple model. Let us use subscript E to represent the relatively 
expert consumers that sort to the high-quality product, and I to represent the relatively inept 
consumers that sort to the low-quality product.  Estimation of (2) restricted to high-quality 
products provides a composite 
 
!P !X
k ( E )
 for each k, while estimating the same equation for 
low-quality products provides 
 
!P !X
k ( I )
. Using (8), we may write out the implicit components 
of the coefficients pertaining to experts and inept consumers 
(9) 
 
!P !X
k ( E )
= !P !X
k D
+ !P !z
( E )
" !z !X
k A( E )
 
(10) 
 
!P !X
k ( I )
= !P !X
k D
+ !P !z
( I )
" !z !X
k A( I )
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where 
 
!P !z
( E )
 and 
 
!P !z
( I )
 represent, respectively, how experts and inept consumers 
collectively value z while 
 
!z !X
k A( E )
 and 
 
!z !X
k A( I )
 represent the surrogate indicator value 
that each group attributes to X
k
.  Note that we are unable to estimate these components directly: 
z is a constant for the high- and low-quality subsamples, so we cannot include it in the equation. 
However, (9) and (10) do indicate that the difference in the coefficient estimates for the constant 
term provides an estimate of 
 
!P !z
( E )
" !P !z
( I )
. 
 Subtracting (9) from (10) yields the relative valuation bias of inept consumers for each 
X
k
, 
(11) 
 
!P !X
k ( I )
" !P !X
k ( E )
= !P !z
( I )
" !P !z
( E )( )dz dXk A( I ) " !P !z( E ) # dz dX k U ( EI )  
This bias is the sum of two components: inept consumers’ relative error in valuing z, weighted 
by their surrogate indicator conjecture about X
k
; and their relative error about the role of X
k
 as 
indicator, dz dX
k U (EI )
! dz dX
k A(E )
" dz dX
k A( I )
, weighted by the experts’ valuation of z.  Note 
that dz dX
k U (EI )
 represents a generalization of dz dX
k U
! dz dX
k T
" dz dX
k A
 from the 
previous section, in which the conjectures of the relative experts who sort to the high-quality 
product replace the total information content represented by the subscript T.  We observe that the 
intrinsic valuation of X
k
 plays no role in the bias; this follows from the presumption that all 
consumers have identical tastes for product attributes.  Intuitively, the relative valuation bias tells 
us how valuations of X
k
 purely as a surrogate indicator differ for consumers sorting to low-
quality versus high-quality products. 
 A corresponding relative conjectural error, µ
k (EI )
!
"z
"Xk A( I )
"z
"Xk A(E )
, generalizes µ
k
; 
here, overshooting, undershooting, and fallacy by inept consumers relative to the  experts may be 
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defined, respectively, as µ
k (EI )
> 1 , µ
k (EI )
! 0,1( ) , and µ
k (EI )
< 0 .  Whereas inferences could not 
drawn about µ
k
, the sorting of consumers does allow us to draw inferences about µ
k (EI ) , based 
on (11).  Table 2 summarizes.  Inferences depend upon the sign of 
 
!P !X
k ( I )
" !P !X
k ( E )
, 
whether the unobservable characteristic is positively or negatively valued, and whether the 
surrogate indicator X
k
 is a positive or negative one with respect to the unobservable 
characteristic. The table’s results depend additionally on the maintained assumption that both 
experts and inept consumers consistently and correctly value z as positive or negative; this 
enables us to posit 
 
!P !z
( E )
> !P !z
( I )
> 0  for a positive z, and 
 
!P !z
( E )
< !P !z
( I )
< 0  for a 
negative z.  We also maintain the assumption that expert consumers are sufficiently expert that 
they are not fallacious, though the inept consumers could be. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 Table 2 shows that the researcher may mainly distinguish only situations in which inept 
consumers overshoot substantially from situations in which they do not.  For example, a positive 
surrogate indicator of a positively valued unobservable characteristic corresponds to a positive 
bias in inept consumers’ valuations only when inept consumers assign substantially more 
surrogate indicator value to the characteristic than is warranted.  Otherwise, the bias will be 
negative.  Note that a negative valuation bias will follow even for modest overshooting, because 
a negative first term may overwhelm a positive second term in (11).  Intuitively, the inept 
consumers’ failure to identify the positive unobservable characteristic when it is present causes 
them to undervalue its presence in general.  This drags down the surrogate indicator value of all 
observable characteristics. 
 
FINDINGS FROM THE MARKET FOR BLACK COHOSH 
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The market for black cohosh provides an opportunity to illustrate the use of unobservable 
product qualities in hedonic analysis and, in particular, to demonstrate the inferences that 
researchers may make based on consumer sorting. 
 
Background 
 A plant native to North America, black cohosh (Latin name Actaea racemosa, formerly 
Cimicifuga racemosa) was used historically by Native Americans for a number of medicinal 
purposes.  Over the past 50 years, it has gained popularity in Europe, and more recently North 
America, as an herbal supplement for treating menopausal symptoms.  As a dietary supplement, 
black cohosh is subject to regulation in the United States by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA).  Following DSHEA’s 
main premise, the rules that cover labeling and good manufacturing practices for dietary 
supplements more closely resemble those that govern foods than the FDA’s rigorous drug 
regulations.  Accordingly, supplements require no premarket clinical testing or approval.  Since 
DSHEA was enacted in 1994, the number of products to which it has applied has grown from 
4,000 to approximately 30,000.  Over the same period, FDA funding for supplement oversight 
has declined.  Consequently, the agency has recently faced severe constraints in its efforts to 
enforce its rules against supplement mislabeling and contamination (Wechsler, 2007). 
 Mislabeling of black cohosh has been recently documented.  In a laboratory study of 11 
products labeled as pure black cohosh, Jiang et al. (2006) detected adulteration in four.  Three of 
these products contained marker compounds for a lower-cost Asian Actaea species, but not those 
expected for American black cohosh.  The fourth contained both Asian Actaea and American 
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black cohosh.  The medicinal uses of Asian Actaea differ from those of American black cohosh, 
and, as noted in National Pharmacopoeia Committee (2005, 50), the health consequences of 
substitution are not known. 
 
Data 
 Our current laboratory analysis expands the sample of Jiang et al. (2006) to include a 
total of 38 distinct products labeled as black cohosh.
5
  Following the procedure outlined in their 
study,
 6
 we employ a combined method of high-performance liquid chromatography – 
photodiode array detection (HPLC-PDA) and selected ion monitoring liquid chromatography – 
mass spectrometry (SIM LC-MS).  The method observes multiple ions in the products in order to 
evaluate whether the products contain black cohosh.  The results of the authentication analysis 
were roughly consistent with Jiang et al.’s results.  25 out of the 38 products were found to 
contain black cohosh, while the other 13 did not.  Thus, approximately 66% of products 
contained black cohosh in the current study, as compared to 73% analyzed by Jiang et al.  For 
obvious reasons, we withhold identifying information on the products studied, though in what 
follows we do report average prices and regression results incorporating the authenticity data. 
 We supplement our authenticity data with data on consumer-observable characteristics 
for the sampled products, which we collected as part of an earlier hedonic study of black cohosh 
that did not account for authenticity (Nagler et al., 2010).  We visited 20 stores in New York 
City and the lower Hudson River Valley and collected non-promotional retail prices for black 
cohosh products sold in the stores.  In total, 55 price observations were made representing the 38 
laboratory-tested black cohosh products in the sample.  In addition to the price data, other 
publicly observable product information was obtained.  For each distinct product, we collected 
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all the information appearing on the label, including ingredients lists and the precise wording of 
all label verbiage.  Using standard Internet search techniques (e.g., Google), we also found and 
collected online consumer ratings of the brands represented.
7
  All data on observable 
characteristics were collected during the summer and fall of 2007. 
 In all, in addition to PRICE (the retail price), the following variables were populated for 
each observation: 
1. NYC, a dummy variable indicating whether the store where the price was observed 
was located in New York City; 
2. RETAILER BRAND, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is a retailer’s 
brand (e.g., Whole Foods, Vitamin Shoppe); 
3. INGREDIENTS, the number of commonly-perceived “active” ingredients listed on 
the label; 
4. VEGGIE, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is suitable for 
vegetarians, based on the ingredients or an explicit label affirmation; 
5. KOSHER, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is kosher, based on an 
explicit label affirmation; 
6. STANDARDIZED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label claims the product 
contains a standardized component or set of components, as determined by industry-
recognized methods (a quality assurance measure); 
7. SIDE EFFECTS, a dummy variable indicating whether the label warns of side 
effects; 
8. SAFE, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “safe” or 
some derivative (e.g., “safely”); 
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9. RATED, a dummy variable indicating whether an online consumer rating could be 
located for the particular brand of black cohosh;  
10. SUM OF RATINGS, the total of the ratings located for the brand (with individual 
ratings normalized to a 1-point scale); 
11. TIME SUPPLY, the number of days of supplement supplied per package, calculated 
as the number of units (e.g., tablets) per package divided by the number of units per 
day in the recommended dosage (or the maximum number of units per day in those 
cases where a range was given); 
12. CERTIFIED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word 
“certified”; 
13. GUARANTEED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word 
“guarantee” or some derivative;  
14. CLAIMS, a dummy variable indicating whether the label makes an affirmative 
therapeutic claim with respect to a specific symptom. 
 
 We partition these variables into two groups, “group A” (#1-11) and “group B” (#12-14).  
Group A consists of characteristics hypothesized to have a direct effect on each product’s price.  
Group B consists of characteristics hypothesized to affect consumers’ valuations (hence prices) 
only through their influence on consumers’ perceptions of the product’s authenticity.  For 
example, the word “safe” on the product label, we propose, conveys value to consumers that 
might result in a price premium because consumers perceive the product so-labeled to be safer, 
and consumers value safety.  Meanwhile, “certified” conveys value to consumers only as a 
potential indicator that the product is more (or less) likely to be authentic. 
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 Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for our data.
8
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Estimation on the Full Sample 
 We begin by estimating the basic hedonic regression model (2) to show the total effect of 
observable product characteristics on price.  For the 
 
X
k
, we include all of the Group A variables 
(#1-11) listed above.  Table 4 (first column) shows the results of this estimation.  The high R-
squared suggests we have captured a substantial portion of the variation in price with our 
included observable characteristics; most of these have a significant influence on the price.  The 
results of the regression are largely consistent with those of the hedonic regressions estimated on 
a larger sample in our earlier paper (Nagler et al. 2010.  We refer the reader to that paper for a 
detailed interpretation of the coefficients.) 
< Insert Table 4 about here> 
 In the second column of Table 4 we present the results of estimating (7), the basic 
hedonic model augmented with authenticity.  As discussed in the model section, authenticity 
must be treated as endogenous, therefore we must instrument for it in our regression.  We do so 
using the Group B variables (#12-14) listed above.  As these variables are hypothesized not to 
appear in (2), the system is fully identified, and we may proceed with estimation by two-stage 
least squares (2SLS).
9
  The coefficients on the 
 
X
k
 in this regression, denoted 
 
!
kD
 in (7), yield 
the influence of each 
 
X
k
 on the log of price, purged of their influence on price through 
authenticity.  Authenticity is insignificant in this regression, but this may be the consequence of 
multicollinearity as the model includes variables that likely are correlated with authenticity. 
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 To understand the relationship of authenticity to observables, we estimate (6). Here, the 
 
X
k
 include all variables #1-14.  The results are shown in Table 5.  As discussed in the model 
section, these results show the true empirical relationship of the observables to unobserved 
authenticity.  Thus, positive indicators (e.g., KOSHER) take positive signs, while negative 
indicators (e.g., STANDARIZED) take negative signs.  Since consumers are not expert 
appraisers in general, the relationship that they infer between the observables and authenticity 
will tend to differ from what the results in Table 5 show. 
< Insert Table 5 about here> 
 Several of the observable characteristics we tracked have a significant relationship to 
authenticity.  It is interesting to note that, while authenticity would likely be positively valued by 
the market if it were observable, the signs of the coefficients on the 
 
X
k
 are not always the same 
in our estimation of (6) as they were in our estimation of (2).  For example, STANDARDIZED is 
a significant positively-valued characteristic overall, but it is a significant negative indicator of 
authenticity, thus its effect on price through authenticity is negative.  One may observe from 
Table 3 that purging STANDARDIZED of its negative influence on price as an indicator of 
authenticity increases the size of its overall positive price effect. 
 Perhaps more striking, a number of label words that seem intended to reassure consumers 
about authenticity turn out to be significant negative indicators of actual authenticity: 
CERTIFIED, GUARANTEED, and CLAIMS (as well as STANDARDIZED) all take significant 
negative coefficients in the regression.  There may be a number of possible marketing 
explanations for why these words appear on labels.  However, their persistent presence seems to 
point to the ineptitude either of a significant portion of consumers or of black cohosh marketers.  
After all, if consumers were expert appraisers, they would figure out quickly that these words 
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counter-indicate authenticity and would tend to steer clear of the associated products.  This 
would induce savvy marketers to remove the words from their products’ labels. 
 It is also interesting to note that our 
 
X
k
, taken together, explain more than three-fifths of 
the total variation in authenticity.  It is fair to say that the potential exists for fairly effective 
appraisal of black cohosh by knowledgeable consumers. 
 
Subsample Estimation: Inferences Based on Sorting 
 To gain insight into the valuation biases and conjectural errors of inept consumers 
relative to more-expert consumers, we re-estimate (2) separately on the subsamples of authentic 
products and non-authentic products.  Consistent with the first column of Table 4, we include all 
Group A variables. 
 The first two columns of Table 6 display the results of the estimation. A number of the 
explanatory variables are omitted from the regressions for either the authentic or non-authentic 
model because they take a constant value across the corresponding subsample, and so provide no 
variation as a basis for estimating a coefficient. Their omission from the regression only affects 
the size of the constant term, and so has no relevance to the coefficients on included explanatory 
variables. However, it makes it impossible to compare constant terms between the models as a 
measure of the relative valuation of the unobservable characteristic, per our discussion in the 
model section. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 There are stark differences in the coefficients estimated for the explanatory variables on 
the two subsamples. Under the assumption that the buyers of authentic and non-authentic black 
cohosh do not differ in their intrinsic valuation of observable characteristics, these differences 
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represent differences in valuation of the observable characteristics purely as surrogate indicators.  
Given that consumers more capable at appraising black cohosh likely tend to sort to the authentic 
products, the coefficient differences may be characterized as representing the relative bias of the 
relatively inept consumers who buy the non-authentic products.  We display the bias explicitly in 
the third column of Table 6. 
 We use our relative bias measures and the decomposition in (11) to determine the relative 
conjectural error of the inept consumers.  We employ the classification in Table 2, taking the 
presumption that authenticity is a positively valued quality, and using the information in Table 5 
on which surrogate indicators are positive and which are negative.  The last column of Table 6 
reports our findings. 
 The results are very interesting.  With respect to most surrogate indicators, the relatively 
inept consumers appear to undershoot – or else, entertain fallacies or modestly overshoot – in 
their conjectures.  This suggests either unawareness or tentativeness about most of the indicators 
of authenticity. But there is one exception: inept consumers overshoot substantially with respect 
to the sum of online ratings.  That is, they place too much weight on the level and frequency of 
online ratings as an indicator of high-quality black cohosh products.  We will discuss the 
possible implications of this finding in the next section. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study presented in this paper has used data on a consumer-unobservable 
characteristic to cast light on consumer decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis suggests 
that the question of how consumers value products with key unobservable qualities is related not 
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just to the issue of what information consumers have before and after purchase, but also to their 
expertise at using it.  Consumers who are inept at appraisal may under- or over-weight 
observable characteristics in their attempts to ascertain unobservable qualities.  These tendencies 
result in problems both for the consumer and the researcher.  Consumers arrive at inaccurate 
determinations as to which products are high- and low-quality and their product valuations are 
correspondingly erroneous.  And marketing researchers who use the empirical relationship 
between observable and unobservable qualities to reconstruct consumers’ surrogate indicator 
valuations of observable characteristics arrive at biased estimates. 
The problem for researchers seeking to extract relevant information about surrogate 
indicator use may be partially resolved by recognizing that consumers sort between high- and 
low-quality products based on their expertise levels.  We illustrated this through a study of the 
black cohosh market in which we measured consumer-unobservable product authenticity as well 
as a range of consumer-observable product characteristics for a sample of brands. By applying 
hedonic estimation separately to authentic and non-authentic product samples, we measured 
expert and inept consumers’ distinct valuations of observable characteristics.  We also measured 
the relative conjectural errors made by inept consumers in using each observable characteristic as 
a surrogate indicator. 
 One important finding from this last element of the analysis was that, while inept 
consumers probably err on the side of being too tentative in their use of most surrogate 
indicators, they appear to construe too much about authenticity from small differences in the 
level and frequency of online product ratings. Online ratings and product commentary are widely 
touted as a source of helpful information on product quality, and it is possible that their 
consequent salience causes many individuals, particularly those who are less skilled at appraising 
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products, to rely on them too heavily.  These same individuals may suboptimally neglect other 
sources of information, such as the wording on product labels. 
 Our finding is consistent with the literature. Banerjee (1992, 1993) shows that decision-
makers may rely excessively on others’ opinions and actions, often substituting inferences from 
these for superior private information. Mayzlin (2006) proposes a model in which online 
communications that appear to be from consumers might have other sources (e.g., firms).  She 
finds in this context that consumers nevertheless rely on anonymous online feedback, making it 
profitable for firms to pose as consumers and create promotional product commentary. 
 Our study generally highlights the value of accounting for consumer-unobservable 
characteristics in marketing research. While this study made use of unique data generated in a 
biochemical laboratory, data on unobservable characteristics may be available to researchers in 
many typical marketing contexts. As experts on their categories, product manufacturers often 
have superior information on the quality of competing products relative to consumers.  
Sophisticated quality measurement techniques, such as those used by Consumer Reports and 
other independent testers, while infeasible for most consumers, may be feasible for researchers. 
 From a managerial perspective, research along the lines of the methods demonstrated 
here may yield a number of useful applications. Performing hedonic analysis separately on 
expert and non-expert consumers may allow managers to develop targeted pricing strategies that 
account for differences in how these two groups value product characteristics as indicators of 
unobservable qualities. Such findings may also allow for targeted product and promotion 
strategies that emphasize product attributes of interest to each group.  Observed differences in 
the conjectural errors with respect to surrogate indicators that non-expert consumers make 
relative to experts provide additional information for managers that may be useful in targeting. 
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 Further work needs to be done.  The present study was limited by its small sample size 
and should therefore be considered exploratory.  In particular, the coefficient estimates 
associated with the two subsamples likely included a substantial amount of noise, and our 
interpretations of the differences and the associated conjectural errors should be weighted 
accordingly.  Replication of our method in other contexts would be helpful in demonstrating its 
uses.  Product markets with important experience and/or credence good qualities pose good 
candidates, particularly where important managerial or policy issues remain unresolved. 
 One example involving policy issues is the market for illegal drugs. Public policy has 
focused on limiting supply through seizure, with mixed results.  One consequence of supply-
chain pressure has been that sellers “cut” their product with baser substances before selling it.
10
  
In regard to reductions in drug purity and their implications for drug policy evaluation, a number 
of questions need to be answered.  To what extent do observable characteristics provide evidence 
of adulterated products?  What observable characteristics are most influential in stimulating 
recognition of adulteration?  Assuming some buyers are less sophisticated than others, what sorts 
of conjectural errors in drug purity evaluation do inept buyers make relative to expert buyers?  
Do supply-chain pressure and consequent effects on drug purity have consequences for which 
type of buyer is predominantly purchasing the product? 
 27 
REFERENCES 
Armstrong, M., Y. Chen, 2009. Inattentive consumers and product quality. Journal of the 
European Economic Association 7(2-3) 411-422. 
Banerjee, A. V., 1992.  A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
107(3) 797-817. 
Banerjee, A. V., 1993. The economics of rumours. Review of Economic Studies 60 309-327. 
Baum, C. F., M. E. Schaffer, S. Stillman, 2003. Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation 
and testing. Stata Journal 3(1) 1–31. 
Brook, T.  1998.  The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China.  Berkeley, 
University of California Press. 
Brucks, M., V. A. Zeithaml, G. Naylor, 2000.  Price and brand name as indicators of quality 
dimensions for consumer durables. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 28(3) 
359-374. 
Burton, S., D. R. Lichtenstein, 1989. The relationship between perceived and objective price-
quality. Journal of Marketing Research 26(4) 429-443. 
Burton, S., D. R. Lichtenstein, 1990. Assessing the relationship between perceived and objective 
price-quality: A replication. Advances in Consumer Research 17(1) 715-722. 
Darby, M. R., E. Karni. 1973. Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. Journal of Law 
and Economics 16(1) 67-88. 
Dulleck, U., R. Kerschbamer. 2006. On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The 
economics of credence goods. Journal of Economic Literature 44(1) 5-42. 
Erdem, T., M. P. Keane, B. Sun, 2008. A dynamic model of brand choice when price and 
advertising signal product quality. Marketing Science 27(6) 1111-1125. 
 28 
Gabaix, X., D. Laibson, 2006. Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information 
suppression in competitive markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2) 505-540. 
Godes, D., D. Mayzlin, 2004. Using online conversations to study word-of-mouth 
communication. Marketing Science 23(4) 545-560. 
Heifitz, A., M. Meier, B. C. Schipper, 2006. Interactive unawareness. Journal of Economic 
Theory 130(1) 78-94. 
Jiang, B., F. Kronenberg, P. Nuntanakorn, M.-H. Qiu, E. J. Kennelly. 2006. Evaluation of the 
botantical authenticity and phytochemical profile of black cohosh products by high-
performance liquid chromatography with selected ion monitoring liquid chromatography-
mass spectrometry. Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry 54(9) 3242-53. 
Jo, M.-S., 2005. Why country of origin effects vary in consumers’ quality evaluation: A 
theoretical explanation  and implications for country of origin management. Journal of 
Global Marketing 19(1) 5-25. 
Johnson, A. R., V. S. Folkes, 2007. How consumers’ assessments of the difficulty of 
manufacturing a product influence quality perceptions. Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science 35(3) 317-328.  
Letizia, P., V. A. Greenfield, P. Reuter, 2009.  The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Li, J., 2009. Information structures with unawareness. Journal of Economic Theory 144(3) 977-
993. 
Liu, Z., 2008. The dirty face problem with unawareness. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical 
Economics 8(1) (Topics) Article 28. 
 29 
Mason, K., T. J. S. Burton, D. Roach, 2001. The accuracy of brand and attribute judgments: The 
role of information relevancy, product experience, and attribute-relationship schemata. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 29(3) 307-317. 
Mayzlin, D., 2006. Promotional chat on the Internet. Marketing Science 25(2) 155-163. 
Nagler, M. G., 1993. Rather bait than switch: deceptive advertising with bounded consumer 
rationality. Journal of Public Economics 51(3), 359-378. 
Nagler, M. G., F. Kronenberg, E. J. Kennelly, B. Jiang. 2010. Pricing for a credence good: A 
hedonic analysis. Working Paper, The City College of New York. 
National Pharmacopoeia Committee. 2005. Chinese Pharmacopoeia 2005A. Beijing: Chemistry 
Industry Press. 
Quester, P. G., S. Dzever, S. Chetty. 2000. Country-of-origin effects on purchasing agents’ 
product perceptions: an international perspective. Journal of Business & Industrial 
Marketing 15(7) 479-490. 
Rao, A. R., K. B. Monroe, 1989. The effect of price, brand name, and store name on buyers’ 
perceptions of product quality: An integrative review. Journal of Marketing Research 
26(3) 351-357. 
Salop, S., J. Stiglitz, 1977. Bargains and ripoffs: a model of monopolistically competitive price 
dispersion. Review of Economic Studies 44(3) 493-510. 
Völckner, F., J. Hofmann, 2007. The price-perceived quality relationship: A meta-analytic 
review and assessment of its determinants. Marketing Letters 18(3) 181-196. 
Wechsler, J. 2007. Ensuring quality for dietary supplements. Pharmaceutical Technology August 
28-38. 
 30 
West, G. E., B. Larue, C. Gendron, S. L. Scott. 2002. Consumer confusion over the significance 
of meat attributes: The case of veal. Journal of Consumer Policy 25(1) 65-88.
 31 
 
                                                
FOOTNOTES 
 
1
 Unawareness may be described by subjective state spaces that may contain full factual information but lack 
awareness information necessary for reasoning with respect to relevant uncertainties.  Thus, the agent possesses 
facts, but they do not “ring a bell” in a way needed to make a relevant inference.  Put another way, the possibility of 
the inference does not “occur” to the agent.  For discussions, see Heifetz et al. (2006), Liu (2008), and Li (2009). 
2
 The archetype of this consumer is the typical guest on the popular public television show, Antiques Roadshow.  
The guest brings an artifact, which has been in her attic for decades, to the show, whereupon an antiques expert 
pronounces it to be extremely valuable, to the highly visible surprise of the guest.  If the guest were herself an expert 
appraiser, she would not act dumbfounded upon learning of the artifact’s true value.  But neither is she completely 
unaware: some observable product characteristic has given her enough of an inkling that the artifact is valuable that 
she decided to bring it to the show for appraisal. 
33
 People obtain indications about product quality from a number of sources, including advertising content and 
intensity, consumption experiences, and prices (e.g., Erdem et al., 2008); as well as word-of-mouth communication 
by other consumers, including online product reviews (Godes and Mayzlin 2004). 
4
 In fact, we expect that expertise in appraisal likely carries across all surrogate indicators, such that people who 
make erroneous conjectures about one 
 
!z !X
k
will likely make larger errors about others.  This is consistent with 
the literature, which views those who make errors versus those who do not as having different traits (e.g., 
attentiveness, myopia, etc.).  For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to introduce this complication into the 
modeling.  However, the notion does provide motivation for thinking of expert and inept appraisers as constituting 
distinct market segments. 
5
 A distinct product consists of a specific brand with a certain number of units per package, a certain formulation 
(e.g., tablet, liquid-filled capsule, etc.), and a distinct set of ingredients. 
6
 For a detailed description, see Jiang et al. (2006), pp. 3243-5. 
7
 Online retailers of dietary supplements, such as Amazon and drugstore.com, and dedicated review sites, such as 
Buzzillions.com, invite consumers to write product reviews.  Typically any visitor to the site can write one.  The 
review process is structured to allow the consumer both to offer a written comment and a numeric rating, usually on 
a 5-point scale.  The comment and rating are then posted to the website for other visitors to view. 
8
 Note that while approximately 66% of distinct products in our sample were determined to be authentic, authentic 
products accounted for roughly 73% of our observations.  This is because authentic products were slightly 
oversampled across retailers relative to non-authentic products. 
9
 GMM estimation is not used here due to its poor small sample properties.  See Baum et al. (2003). 
10
 For an extended discussion, see Letizia et al. (2009). 
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Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Full sample (N = 55)
PRICE 12.782 6.404 4.790 28.990
NYC 0.764 0.429 0.000 1.000
RETAILER BRAND 0.164 0.373 0.000 1.000
INGREDIENTS 1.018 0.135 1.000 2.000
VEGGIE 0.418 0.498 0.000 1.000
KOSHER 0.055 0.229 0.000 1.000
STANDARDIZED 0.745 0.440 0.000 1.000
SIDE EFFECTS 0.291 0.458 0.000 1.000
SAFE 0.182 0.389 0.000 1.000
RATED 0.400 0.494 0.000 1.000
TIME SUPPLY 47.267 39.550 2.250 240.000
CERTIFIED 0.091 0.290 0.000 1.000
GUARANTEED 0.345 0.480 0.000 1.000
CLAIMS 0.345 0.480 0.000 1.000
AUTHENTICITY 0.727 0.449 0.000 1.000
Subsample of online-rated products (N = 22)
SUM OF RATINGS 9.277 7.298 0.800 15.980
Table 3        Descriptive Statistics
Dependent variable: log of PRICE
(1) (2)
Pure hedonic 
(OLS)
Including 
AUTHENTICITY (2SLS)
NYC -0.1706* -0.0891
(0.0096) (0.1121)
RETAILER BRAND -0.7438*** -0.6728***
(0.1660) (0.1619)
log of INGREDIENTS 0.4186 0.5991
(0.4522) (0.4374)
VEGGIE 0.2632** 0.2290**
(0.0998) (0.0951)
KOSHER -0.1222 -0.2264
(0.2474) (0.2409)
STANDARDIZED 0.2930*** 0.4176***
(0.1077) (0.1405)
SIDE EFFECTS 0.2235 0.2068
(0.1406) (0.1290)
SAFE 0.4288*** 0.4303***
(0.1497) (0.1366)
RATED -0.7378*** -0.7247***
(0.1491) (0.1364)
SUM OF RATINGS 0.0359*** 0.0298***
(0.0107) (0.0109)
TIME SUPPLY 0.0073*** 0.0073***
(0.0015) (0.0014)
AUTHENTICITY 0.2803
(0.2261)
Constant 2.0323*** 1.7008***
(0.1416) (0.2969)
N 55 55
R
2 0.6918 0.6719
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***,**, and * represent significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4     Hedonic Regression Results - Full Sample
Dependent variable: Authenticity
NYC -0.2639**
(0.1189)
RETAILER BRAND -0.6625***
(0.2222)
log of INGREDIENTS -1.3011**
(0.5383)
VEGGIE -0.0586
(0.1225)
KOSHER 0.6226**
(0.2955)
STANDARDIZED -0.6085***
(0.1440)
SIDE EFFECTS -0.2922
(0.1925)
SAFE 0.0316
(0.1694)
RATED 0.1294
(0.1734)
SUM OF RATINGS 0.0265**
(0.0124)
TIME SUPPLY -0.0005
(0.0018)
CERTIFIED -0.3733*
(0.2175)
GUARANTEED -0.5175***
(0.1607)
CLAIMS -0.3639**
(0.1648)
Constant 1.7898***
(0.2286)
N 55
R
2 0.6051
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***,**, and
* represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
Table 5     Regression Results - Indicators of Authenticity
                  and Estimates of Relative Valuation Bias and Conjectural Error
Dependent variable: log of PRICE
(1) (2)
Authentic      
Subsample    
(OLS)
Non-authentic           
Subsample    
(OLS)
Relative Bias     
of Inept 
Consumers
Relative          
Conjectural            
Error
NYC -0.0994 Omitted
(0.0915)  
RETAILER BRAND -1.1878*** -0.8215** 0.3663 FUSO
(0.2849) (0.3327)
log of INGREDIENTS Omitted 0.7597
(0.6150)
VEGGIE 0.3811*** 0.6035* 0.2224 FUSO
(0.1308) (0.3048)
KOSHER -0.1078 Omitted
(0.2218)  
STANDARDIZED 0.2339* Omitted
(0.1249)  
SIDE EFFECTS 0.0260 1.7940* 1.768 FUSO
(0.1585) (0.8963)
SAFE 0.7468*** 0.2520 -0.4948 FUSO
(0.2262) (0.4003)
RATED -1.1484*** -2.5348* -1.3864 FUSO
(0.1912) (1.1952)
SUM OF RATINGS 0.0502*** 0.8325* 0.7823 large overshoot
(0.0110) (0.4288)
TIME SUPPLY 0.0134*** 0.0089** -0.0045 FUSO
(0.0032) (0.0025)
Constant 1.8882*** 1.8690***
(0.1564) (0.2242)
N 40 15
R
2 0.7869 0.7802
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***,**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.  Variables that took constant values within a subsample were omitted from the corresponding
regression, as indicated.  FUSO = fallacy, undershoot, or small overshoot.
Table 6     Hedonic Regression Results - Subsamples
